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THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN POTTERY IN JAPAN 
-SETO AND NAGOYA-
By Yasuo MISHIMA * 
FORWORD 
In probing the history of the industrial revolution in Japan, too much 
emphasis has apparently been placed in the past on clarifying the process 
of growth of the fibre industry (cotton and silk) to the negligence of other 
fields. With this in view, an effort will be made in the following sections 
to make clear how the pottery industry, as an example of a "non-typical 
industrial revolution,"** was organized and what relation it had with other 
productive activities, and how, under such relationship, it could adapt itself 
to the impact of an industrial revolution. The study has been undertaken 
with main emphasis focussed on tracing the development of the relation 
between the industrial capital in Seto (northeast of Nagoya) and the whole-
salers' commercial capital in Nagoya. (Additionally," pottery" in this 
monograph pertains to both pottery and porcelain.) 
1. REORGANIZATION OF POTTERY CAPITAL. 
• 
Following the Meiji Restoration, the feudal clan of Owari ceased to 
exist and the Seto district was liberated from the jurisdiction of the feudal 
administrative agency of the "Mizuno Daikansho" and placed, in July 
1868, under the rule of the T6h6 S6kansho (Eastern Administration) of A-
ichi Prefecture, a local subordinate organ of the new Meiji regime. 
The monopoly policy and the Kuramoto*** system of feudal merchant 
agents hitherto pursued by the Owari clan were abolished. Seto, while 
being deprived of the protective patronage of the feudal clan, on one hand, 
was, on the other hand, freed from various feudal guild restrictions such 
!, a~limitation of each household to one potter's wheel and of kiln stook. 
,-.:~'~:: :>~\~., ~3.,jr::;c:-;1<_;~, -------
","".:''-' 
}'( ~ __ The author is a member of the Economic Society at Kyoto University . 
•• By "non t . I' d . I I'" . d . I I' ,-,.l-rn j:- _ - , - yplca In ustna reVa utlOfl, we mean m ustna revo utlOns 
" copper, pottery and salt etc. excluding cotton. 
-c " **. Kuramoto means privileged merchant subordinated to each feudal clan. 
in iron, coal, 
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For one thing, it could be said that Seto was thus allowed to keep pace 
with· the newly-acquired free economy. While we do not know clearly 
what situation actually prevailed in Seto village in the early years ofMeiJi, 
it is recorded that the local population, according to a religious registry . 
dated 1870, included 1,300 males and 1,201 females, bringing the total to 
2,501. 
One contemporary record says, in part: 
"The destitute among the villagers number about 295 households, or 
about 800 in population. A majority of these find it difficult to keep living 
by farming alone and engage in wage-earning by being employed in pot-
tery. Now, a general depression in pottery is forcing the industry to dis-
charge quite a number of their employees: ..... " 
This amply shows that those destitute families who found it impossible , 
to keep living by farming alone numbered no less than 295 out of a total 
of about 550 households and that most of these families barely kept up 
their meager living as wage-earners and apprentices to potters. It is likewise 
evident that, losing old markets due to the political chaos before and after 
the Meiji Restoration, the pottery entrepreneurs had to meet the business 
depression by discharging large numbers of their employees. Now, it should 
be noted that the business depression in these years was mainly due to the 
fact that the pottery products manufactured in the Seto district hitherto, 
were only those such as special water bowls, tea pots, flower-vases for the 
tea ceremony, braziers, stepping-stones, flower-pots, garden stone-steps and 
sake bottles, for which there was no great mass demand (according to the 
catalogue of the great domestic exhibition in 1876). Most of these products 
were luxury items and not suitable for the destitute farming classes 
which composed a major part of the domestic consumer>. The business 
depression in pottery persisted, except for a short period of business boom 
after the Kyiishii Rebellion in 1877, until the industry discovered a new 
outlet for its products in exports to foreign countries around 1887. The 
Meiji government, while importing machinery and raw materials required 
for the expanding military factories and other key industries, vigorously 
encouraged, as a means to counter-balance such imports, the export of raw 
silk and tea, and also pottery products which could be manufactured with 
domestic materials. The energetic execution of this policy made it impera-
tive that the pottery be fully able to meet the demands of the foreign 
markets. To meet the new trends, the pottery capitalists of Seto were eager 
to import new techniques. In 1874, a certain Tomotaro Kato, a pottery 
craftsman, was sent to Tokyo to study how to use plaster molds and the 
new-fashioned kilns designed by Dr. Wagner, a German engineer invited 
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by the government to assist in the importation of modern scientific techniques. 
With new techniques thus introduced in rapid succession, Seto, as early as 
December 1878, saw the number of kilns increased to 305 (containing 50 
round kilns, 180 small kilns, and 75 inclining kilns).!) Kiln workers in-
creased to 132 and other employees to 875, a marked increase over the 
year 1869. 
Nagoya, about 18 kilometers away from Seto, was in the feudal era 
a center of local distribution of pottery through the Seto district and the 
eastern part of Gifu Prefecture. The pottery capitalists in Nagoya gradual-
ly underwent a qualitative metamorphosis from being feudalistic commercial 
capitalists to being export wholesalers. One interesting instance is recorded 
in which a subordinate feudal samurai called Tadaatsu Mizutarii, following 
the disintegration of his clan (Owari), is said to have boldly discarded his 
old samurai pride and personally proceeded to Seto to make purchases of local 
pottery products. This was simply an instance of the general tendency 
among the samurai class, who together with the change of times, had to 
become more business-minded just in order to support themselves. Their 
wholesale capital began to control Seto. These Nagoya wholesalers put 
themselves in the service of major exporters in Tokyo and Kobe, such as 
the Morimura-gumi* which had been insignificant saddle merchants at Yedo 
until the early years of Meiji, the Van TIyne Commercial Company, the 
Matsumura Commercial Company, the Kansai Trading Company and the' 
Takifuji Commercial Company. In the face of the new situation thus brought 
about, the small-scale producers in Seto had no alternative than to resign 
themselves to a subordinate position under such wholesale commercial ca-
pitalists, who, as they were not exclusively engaged in pottery, refused to 
set up any branch offices at Seto but maintained them in Nagoya, from 
whence purchases could be made at nearby Seto. Thus, around 1882 al-
most no shops dealing in pottery could be observed in Seto, business being 
conducted almost exclusively directly by Nagoya wholesalers. The Morimura-
gumi was shrewd enough to see the trends of the market in the United 
States, and planned to have Seto artisans make chinaware for export. The 
first experiment, which proved a great success, was made in coffee cups in 
1883. The next step taken at Seto was the placing of orders for the pro-
duction of tea sets including pitchers, sugar and cream pots. Thus, Seto 
pottery took the first step towards a basic change to mass production of 
daily necessaries for export. However, to begin such large scale production, 
1) History of Aichi Prefecture, Vol. III, p. 450. 
*"gu"" . ml means a commercIal company. 
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the small scale of Seto production was a restriction. In 1883, local occupa-
tions at Seto were classified as follows: Farming, 389 households,ci>mbin~ 
ing farming pottery, 147 households, industry,27 households, farming (as 
landowner) and pottery middlemen, 6 households, commerce, 20 households, 
and others, 182 households. The existence of 27 households engaged in 
industry indicates the emergence of exclusive pottery manufacturers, who had 
by this time broken away from farming. The fact that 147 households 
combined farming and pottery, on the other hand, shows that Seto was, 
as a whole, in a stage of small-scale semi-agricultural and semi-industrial 
production. It was obvious that these obsolete mechanisms of production 
operated on a small scale could not properly function as demand arose for 
mass production for export. In view of this, Nagoya wholesaler capitalists 
formulated a process by which the initial stages of manufacture involving 
digging of earth, its refining, forming and the firing of the unglazed pot-
tery were undertaken by small-scale manufacturers in Seto, while the semi-
finished products, thus produced, were bought up by the wholesale dealers 
of Nagoya, who had them finished with pattern-paintings and firing in 
Nishiki-gama(finishing kilns) by experts exclusively employed by them. 
Pattern-paintings were made either at the private homes of these experts 
Table I. Pattern-Painting"Undertaken by Nagoya Wholesalers.* 
! I Category I I 
Personal I " Inaugu-
I 
Name Location Name rated in 
Pottery Glazing I Glazing I Ryokawa- I ROkunosukel March, 
Station and Firing ramachi SHIMIZU 1883 
Matsumura Producing; Minami Kyusuke February, 
Porcelain Manu- Glazing Takehira- MATSU- 1885 
factory and Firing ch5 MURA 
Takifuji Glazing 
Station aZl.n~ Sotobori-
I GI' I Minami 
and Flnng ch6 
I Manjiro I February, 
TAKIFUJI 1888 
Pottery I Glazing I Shindeki- I Yakuro I April, NAKA-Manufactory . and Firing machi MURA 1893 
or at the small Manufakturen** operated by the wholesalers. This process 
of manufacture, in which production was partially undertaken by" thewhole-
salers, designed as a means to meet the demands for mass production, came 
* Table I. is from" Bisan Hokan." ~$-Jt( .. Vol. III, p. 159. 
=to* "Manufaktur" has a special meaning as a capitalistic plant which employs 1 0-50 laborers, 
who, using manual tools, are arranged for a type of co_operation based on the division 
of labor. "Manufaktur" is the special stage which is situated between handicraft and 
modern mechanized factory in the development of industrial history. 
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to be widely employed after about 1887 or somewhat earlier. Table I. 
indicates the process of the participation by the wholesalers in production. 
The prevalence of the process steadily brought the small local producers 
in Seto and big wholesale capitalists in Nagoya into an increasingly closer 
relationship. The industrial producers in Seto, virtually void of any com-
mercial functions, when they faced the new and different problem of ac-
quiring new markets overseas, could expand only through the medium of 
big commercial capitalists in Nagoya, while, on the other hand, the 
capitalists in Nagoya, by dealing in the merchandise produced by Seto's 
own expanding productive capacity, could increase their own business pro-
fits. Thus, it is seen that, up to 1887, the commercial capitalists in Nagoya 
and the industrial capitalists of Seto were in a position of mutually depen-
dent transactional relations, and made a parallel development. 
According to Table II, the pottery industry at Seto showed a sharp 
decline in its production following the adoption in 1881 of a policy of 
deflation by the then Finance Minister Masayoshi Matsukata. The price 
for a simple piece averaged 5.9 sen in 1881, 3.9 sen in 1882 and 2.9 sen in 
1883. During the deflationary period, the big demand arising from increas-
ing contact with foreign markets and various domestic factors indicated in 
such a sharp decline in price, combined to speed up the inevitable disin-
tegration of small manufacturers at Seto: they were either elevated to a 
position of full-fledged capitalistic ManrJakturen (and land owners, at the 
same time) or degraded to the rank and file of working proletarians. It 
is needless to say that it was the destitute farming households in Higashi-
Kasugai county, Aichi Prefecture, of which Seto is the center, which furni-
shed most of the labor, as wage earners, to manufacturers of Seto as their 
newly-acquired position as modern capitalistic Manufakturen was steadily 
consolidated. 
Table II. Seto during the Deflationary Period. * 
Years 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 
Number of pieces manu- 2,960,0003,950,000 5,170,000 4,750,0004,290,0004,140,000 
factured 
Price (Yen) 230,411 255,036 295,636 283,603 171,510 122,814 
Price per one 
piece (Sen) 7.7 6.4 5.7 5.9 3.9 2.9 
~ { : (1 Yen=lOO Sen) 
II. is from" History of Aichi Prefecture." Vol. III, p. ,452. 
36 Y. MISHIMA 
Table III. Business Condition in 1885 •• 
Laborers 112114116117118121 124134136 employed Total: 14 
Manufactw 80/0 as against total I 5 I I I 2 I I I number of manufactw uring uring households. Household.s 
It was against such a background that Seto pottery production by 
degrees acquired shape as a modem capitalistic Mamifaktur. A look at 
Table III. shows that, in 1885, there were fourteen plants where between 
12 and 36 wage-earners (presumably including apprentices and those work-
ing at individual homesteads) each were employed. The number equalled 
approximately 8 % of all enterprises at Seto. If, for the· convenience of , 
statistics, each plant which employed twelve workers at a minimum is num-
bered as a Manufaktur, 8 % of the Seto pottery industry had attained the 
stage of a modern capitalistic Manujaktur based on a division of labor and 
co-operation as early as 1885. While its gradual transformation into such 
a modern capitalistic Manufaktur increased in tempo between 1890 and 1910, 
the process was technically substantiated with the steady introduction of 
new technical and engineering devices, involving the adoption of the long-
distance precipitation method, of the clay-disturber and the clay-compressor 
in the earth refining process, the use of plastic molds in the forming process, 
the transition to copper-plate printing from hand-drawing in the painting 
process, the employment of oxidized cobalt in the producing of pigments, 
and the transition to limestone from isu-ashes in the producing process 
of glazing. 
Now, four industrial capitalists at Seto, S. Ito, K. Kato, G. Kato and 
M. Kawamoto, in the face of the deflation, attempted to exploit a new 
market through their own endeavor, and, for that purpose, succeeded in 
1881 in mobilizing financial support from both the Strong & Co. (British) 
and Ichitaro Morimura (founder of the Morimura-gumi company, later 
known as Ichizaemon Morimura), and, by dint of such support, established 
an exclusively-contracted sales agent known as the JikOsha, in Tokyo. The 
adventure, however, ended in failure; in 1885, the agent was dissolved for 
want of funds. Similar attempts were repeated several times after this (e. 
g., the Japan Pottery and Porcelain Sale Company was established in Tokyo 
in 1887), all of which, however, failed due to insufficiency of necessary cir-
culating funds. The result was that their sales markets were left to the 
mercy of local Nagoya wholesaler-capitalists. In IBB5, when the effects of 
* Table III. is from "Bulletin of Geopolitics" Vol. II, p. 84. 
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the deflation were felt most severely in Seto, they moved to set up the 
Seto JikOgumi (the Association of Pottery Producing Industrialists in Seto), 
the working regulations of which included such provisions as: 
Article 18. Sales contracts for goods shall be concluded only in the 
presence of the director and vice-director of the association. 
Article 19. No goods shall be made wantonly without approval of the 
associa tion. 
Article 20. The quality of the goods produced shall be strictly classi-
fied into superior, medium and inferior, and no indiscriminate selling shall 
be allowed. 
Article 21. Payments for goods sold shall be received at the offices of 
the association, which shall take it upon itself to have them duly delivered 
to the appropriate recipient. 
I t is evident that this' was an attempt on the part of the Seto Jikogumi 
to place production and sales under a set of strict restrictions to prevent 
small producers from directly contacting wholesaler-capitalists and from 
selling their products on behalf of the wholesaler-capitalists. Their attempt, 
however, proved ineffective eventually, in the face of the growing pressure 
of the wholesaler-capitalists, and they gradually fell under their control. 
This coincided with the decline of the old pottery craftsmen who had 
enjoyed special feudal privileges under the protection of the Owari clan. The 
case of Tamikichi Kataoffers a typical example in this connection. Through 
three generations, the Kata family was patronized by the local feudal 
lord, under whose special permit, it enjoyed the rare privilege of carrying 
a family name and a sword as well as being a recipient of a fixed amount 
of allowance in kind. (Of sixteen families which had been permitted to 
have family names and swords, Tamikichi's family was the highest in social 
position at the end of feudal era). The fortune of the Kata family, in spite 
of the change of times, managed to retain its old shape, until, in 1889-90, 
the family became a victim of a deceitful business transaction, as a result of 
which, and, coupled with a succession of unfortunate family happenings, it 
was eventually lost irrevocably and the renowned Kata family entirely 
disappeared from among the pottery producers in Seto. These producers have 
by now been completely subordinated to the modern commercial capital-
ists. Taking the place of the old pottery creftsmen who gradually headed 
tOr-ard decline, was a group of new pottery industrialists, who, while content-
. themselves with being given money in advance by the Nagoya mer-
.: . : .. <' .. ,. Who were both wholesalers and money-lenders simultaneously, found 
<., steadily transformed into modern capitalistic Mamgakturen closely 
Jj'?Jed With foreign markets by the medium of the Nagoya merchants. It 
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was unavoidable that this group by degrees came to the fore and formed 
the main forces of the Seto industry. Around 1882, this particular~oup 
occupied a mere 20% of the entire pottery industrialists," but around 1900 the 
percentage, as will be discussed later, showed a phenomenal rise to 90%. 
The percentage of pottery exports in the total production of pottery 
products in Japan stood at 28.2% in 1878-1882 and at 43.2% in 1883-1887." 
The figure amply explains the general tendency followed by the pottery 
industry of Japan in these years, when, as has already been described ear-
lier, production of tea-sets and other daily tablewares grew to a remarkable 
extent to meet dem3,llds abroad. 
2. SUBSEQUENT GROWTH AND LABOR CONDITIONS 
After the deflation, the Seto industry, in the face of a business boom 
seen after 1887, experienced a phenomenal expansion. According to Table 
IV, the period between 1872 and 1892 saw Seto's population grow by 
about 1.4 times, while the number of households doubled. This shows that, 
keeping pace with the modernization of the pottery industry at Seto, manual 





Table IV. The Poulation of Seto.* 
Years I Households I Population 
1872 I 663 I 2984 
1882 I 771 I 3871 
1892 I 1431 I 5381 
of Mizuno, Asahi and Hatayama. Cheap 
labor, thus supplied from the lowest class 
of destitute farming villages in the neigh-
borh9od, had to work under typically mi-
serable labor conditions for half-modernized 
small-scale Manufakturen. Labor involved in 
the pottery industry consisted of outdoor 
labor, comprising earthdigging and trans-
portation of the materials and of such indoor work as earth-refining, 
forming, glazing, pottery-filling, firing, painting, finishing and packing, as 
well as various minor secondary work. 
These different operations, further, were properly linked by a number 
of manual workers. We will give a survey of what these various work 
processes actually were and under what specific conditions they were con-
ducted. 
(A) Material was dug out from the earth in a highly primitive fashion, 
in which pickaxes were used. Electric motors were introduced for the first 
time as late as 1920, while those engaged in this state of labor were mostly 
2) Reports of Investigation for Promotion of Seta City, p. 56. 
3) Takaka Sanbe: Process of Transition of Peasants' Cottage Industry, p. 193. 
* Table IV. is from "Reports of Investigation for Promotion of Seta City" p. 61. 
THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN POTTERY IN JAPAN 39 
'poor local farmers who offered their manual labor when it was not required 
on their fields. Labor, thus offered, was extremely cheap, while the major 
portion of this earth work depended on the selection ability of the naked 
human eye. And cheapness of labor worked to prevent an early introduc-
tion of mechanized processes. 
(B) The process comprising forming, glazing and kiln operation was 
mostly conducted in the plant which was simply a portion of the dwelling 
quarters especially rearranged for that purpose. Sometimes such a plant 
was erected adjacent to the living sections. In either case, workers employed 
here consisted of teen-age youngsters who, as apprentices, had to undergo 
relentless courses of training and learning for five or six years. These 
apprentices were of two different types: one stayed at the plant day and 
night, where board and bed were offered free. They had to work without 
any pay except an insignificant amount of occasional pocket money. The 
others went daily to the plant from their respective homes. These young 
workers toiled like slaves from dawn till sunset. Such sweatshop labor 
persisted until about 1907, when the introduction of electric power in the 
forming process simplified the operation and helped to elevate the status 
of these apprentices to that of more or less modern laborers. 
(C) The employment of women and juvenile laborers in the small-
scale household industry was a common and prevalent practice. Especially 
in the pottery industry, the percentage of their employment was comparative-
ly high, while they were chiefly employed in the process of transportation 
and drying or disposal of the material stuffs. It was early recognized, how-
ever, that their employment as a substitute for mechanical installations 
entailed a sharp physical deterioration and premature death. The condi-
tion prevailing was such that small boys even under the age of ten were 
forced to work for hours, many times far into the night. In addition, 
many school children were employed as working hands after school (such 
was the case, also, with the match manufacturing industry in many parts 
of Japan). That school children were asked to work with their families 
was a fact that can not afford to be overlooked in connection with the 
labor question involved in the Seto pottery industry. It was quite a com-
mon practice for these teen-age juveniles to be forced to assist in the open-
air drying of the semi-finished products or in the simple coloring of dolls 
in order that the products be delivered on time. Besides, young boys were 
widely utilized in such trivial jobs as delivery, painting, pattern-drawing, 
finishing, packing and other odd jobs. 
These women and children who offered labor were paid out of what 
their operating household earned. But, in many cases, they received no 
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pay at all, and it was often the case that what should have been paid 
them as wages was erroneously construed as profit. 
Thus, it is seen that the required cheap and abundant technical 
labor of the pottery industry at Seto was supplied by the local destitute 
farming population. 
In its intrinsic shape, the labor system still retained many features of 
the semi-feudalistic tenancy system, and combined the old system of ap-
prenticeship, plus daily wage workers and subsidiary work by women and 
children. The conditions of labor under which these apprentices were 
asked to work were so bad that in most cases they could not stay at one 
post for any long period of time, and, to fill the gap thus caused, the 
employer had to look for new labor frequently. The going and comings 
were so common that these pottery workshops were often referred to as 
"railway stations." Permanent workmen were very rare, and, shifts of 
men were generally so frequent that at least 30 percent of the employees 
usually moved out of a shop during a year. The percentage, of course, 
rose higher in the case of medium and small-scale plants. The persistent 
existence of cheap and abundant labor, then, was the main factor preven-
ting the mechanization of the Seto industry and permitting the continuance 
of the small scale Manufakturen and cottage producers over a .long period 
Y', " ( ~ GIFU 
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of time. Produced with such cheap labor, the Setomono, meaning pottery 
articles of Seto, could be marketed so cheaply that in spite of the persistent 
accusations about the practice of social dumping, they could virtually dom-
inate the markets of China, Manchuria, South-east Asia and Australia. 
In 1887, the Kyoto Toki Kaisha (the Kyoto Pottery Company) took 
the initiative in importing a set of modern machines from France in an 
energetic attempt to set up the first mechanized factory in Japan, to 
which between twenty and thirty workers were dispatched from Seto. 
The company, however, was bankrupt after two' years. The cause for this 
can be found in the fact that about this time the workers, with experience 
in the type of labor specialization common to modern capitalistic Manufa-
ktur, who were the necessary premise for mechanized production, were less 
than ten percent of the entire group. The majority knew only obsolete tech-
niques fit for household manual labor and, naturally, totally lacked the 
capacity to operate modern imported machines. And, this fact points to 
one obvious instance of contradictions latent in the industrial policy pur-
sued by the absolutistic Meiji government, for, in its impatient endeavour 
to modernize japan's industries, it imported modern Western industrial 
machines, disregarding the situation in which the Japanese pottery lU-
dustry actually stood. 
3. ON THE EVE OF AN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION. 
Seto after 1887 saw its own transformation into a modern capitalistic 
Manifaktur, and, at the same time, deepening dependence on the whole-
saler-capitalists in Nagoya. Around 1890, Seto was able to produce articles 
of the various shapes of a "fancy" line. Semi-finished pottery articles for 
export were mostly done in Seto, which, naturally, brought a remarkable 
business boom to the local economy. The Morimura-gumi was quick to 
conclude a special contract with several Seto pottery Manufakturen where 
required semi-finished articles were manufactured. Its financial leadership 
was thus gradually but steadily established, while such wholesalers as the 
Kansai Boeki Kaisha (the Kansai Trading Company) and the Van Dyne 
Commercial Company, in competition, moved in to link themselves with 
specially-contracted plants, the makers of semi-finished products, which, 
Dr<)U~:nt to Nagoya, were finished with pattern painting by exclusively con-
,~·Fa~ artisans or Manufakturen which were managed by the wholesalers them-
.. """"/" .... . The amount of pottery articles finished by the Nagoya whole-
saler-manufacturers stood, in 1885, at ¥ 3 I ,000, and, in 1886, ¥ 42,000, in 
value. "Itrose to ¥360,000 in 1889,') with the advent of a business boom, 
4) Tatsuya Naramoto: Emergence of the Modern Pottery Industry, p. 77. 
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when the pottery industry established itself as a promising export industry. 
A sharp decline in the exchange rate of the Japanese yen further spurred 
the trend. In the early years of Meiji, the rate stood at $100 against 
¥ 100. The value of the yen then gradually declined, and around 1894, 
it was quoted at below $50, which helped to make Japan's export indus-
try a highly profitable enterprise. Reflecting this, the pottery products 
finished by the Nagoya wholesale-mannfacturers in 1895, amounted to 
¥500,000 in value. The wholesale-manufacturers then numbered 31, and 
the Nishiki-gama (finishing kilns) 225, where 1,200 workers were employed.') 
About 1890, the Morimura-gumi had its pattern-painting Manufakturen dis-
persed at Tokyo (four plants), Kyoto (one plant) and Nagoya (one plant). 
In 1896, in the light of a new trend which was making itself manifest, they 
hastily moved all these Manufakturen to Shumoku-cho in Nagoya, where a 
group of Manufakturen succeeded in systematizing the flow of production. 
The Morimura-gumi was not alone in this bold enterprising attempt; those 
wholesale-manufacturers with large capital resources undertook in rapid 
succession to place the Seto pottery industrialists under their exclusive capi-
talistic dominance. A statistical survey made in 1904 of the pottery indus-
try in Aichi Prefecture records the following: "The principal manufac-
turers in operation around 1900 numbered 396 in Seto, 31 in Akatsu village 
and III in Shinano village. Of the above, 16 were operating under a 
special contract with the Morimura-gumi in Nagoya, and the value of the pro-
ducts thus produced amounted to about ¥200,000. On the other hand, 6 had 
a special contract with the Tashiro Company in Nagoya, and 5 with the 
Tsuzuki Company, also in Nagoya. Not a few others, also, were operating 
under a similar exclusive contract with the Hirako, Hirose and other lead-
ing wholesale-manufacturers in Nagoya." It is also recorded that, of the 
Seto products intended for export, a mere 10 percent were finished goods. 
These were exported to China, and included an insignificant portion of 
artistic articles sent to Western countries. The remaining 90 percent 
consisted of semi-finished goods, which, before being exported, had to be 
painted, glazed and re-fired. Thus, these goods were sent en masse to the 
plants operated by the Morimura-gumi, Takifuji Company and other 
wholesalers with whom the Seto industrialists had special contracts. These 
products were named Kinran-yaki. Most, however, found their way to the 
Morimura Manufakturen, where painting, glazing and firing was done. TJ:e 
products, thus finished, were mostly exported to America. It is seen, thus, 
that the production of the Morimura-gumi, who had concentrated by mov-
5) Bisan Hokan. Vol. III, p. 171. 
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ing from Tokyo and Kyoto, was already in 1900 the greatest of all the 
wholesale capitalists. The scale of. these finishing Manufakturen in Nagoya 
attained a further phenomenal expansion after 1896, as shown in Table V, 
and, in 1903, the workers averaged 53 per Manufaktur. 
The Manufakturen and cottage producers in Seto who were bound as 
Table V. Glazing Manufacturen contract plants to these wholesalers came 
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plants. Coffee cups, plates, cream pots, 
sugar pots, and big oblong plates were 
all manufactured by expert manufacturers 
III large quantities, and finished with 
painting, glazing and firing in Nagoya. 
This form of manufacture was inevitable, 
due to the diversity of designs in case of 
such articles as tea sets and dinner sets 
(100 pieces, standard). In substance, such a form. of manufacturing was 
identical to a system of dispersed plants, where a round of affiliated plants 
would achieve the result similar to what would be possible by a major plant, 
while the advantages of a system of divided operation were fully assured. 
On the part of the wholesale-manufacturers, likewise, it was more profit-
able to have a chain of sub-contracted medium and small plants operated 
with sweated labor than to have their own big plants set up with their Own 
funds. The formula, however, had its inevitable limitations. True, it was 
appropriate simply for meeting the increased amount of production and for 
effecting a uniformity of the designs and patterns of the products. How-
ever, it never was instrumental in effecting a fundamental change in the 
formula of production. 
Now, turning to the export markets, we find that Japan's pottery ex-
ports to America, the main market for them, rose to $469,707 in value 
in 1901 from a mere $97,244 in 1886.6) The rate of volume imported by 
America, however, registered only a rise to 4.8% from 1.9%, which indi-
cated the difficulty encountered by Japan, a late comer in making inroads 
in the American market, where her predecessors, Germany, England and 
France, had previously established their dominance. It should be noted, 
however, that during the period under review, the rate of England went 
down to 30% from 62%, while, on the other hand, Germany rose to 37% 
from 17% to virtually rule the American market. Thus, for the newly-
• Table V. is from Tatsaya Naramoto: Emergence of Modern Pottery Industry~ p. 77. 
6) Tatsuya NaramQto Ibid. p. 87, 
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rising Japanese pottery industry, Germany posed as a most formidable rival 
to tackle. A certain Japanese businessman, who happened to be in Amer-
ica for training at that time is quoted to have remarked that theAmer-
ican people bought Japanese pottery articles for the novelty of Japanese 
painted designs and traditional shapes, whereas German products were 
purchased for sheer necessity. It was a fact that out of every five dozens 
of imported Japanese articles, half a dozen or a dozen was invariably found, 
on examination, to lack uniformity both in size and shape.7) In point 
of utility and uniformity, thus, Japanese products could not compare to 
German, English and French products. This was because of the difference ' 
in production efficiency between the modern mechanized factories in these 
Western countries which had completed their industrial revolutions and 
the semi-modernized wholesaler's Manufaktur system still in force in the 
Nagoya area, the principal producing area of export pottery in Japan. 
While partly successful in assuring a mass production in uniformity, Japan's 
system of production proved no match for the streamlined operation pos-
sible in foreign modern mechanized factories. To overcome all the dis-
advantages accruing from this, an "industrial revolution", as far as the 
traditional wholesaler-manufacturers were concerned, had to be faced as a 
historical necessity. The demand added to the urgency of an industrial 
revolution, when, with the completion of a modern Nagoya port with ac-
commodations for 1O,000-ton class ocean liners on the New York line, the 
American market demand for superior-quality goods brought its weight 
directly upon the local pottery industry. 
4. INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION-TWO TYPES. 
The tendency toward transformation into modern capitalistic Manufak-
tur at Seto, which was manifest from about 1885, gradually increased its 
tempo. In 1895, the plants employing between 12 and 60 which could be 
classified as such modern capitalistic Manufaktur numbered 33, occupying 
12.6 % of the total ;8) in 1905, those plants using between 10 and 90 
numbered 82, occupying 21.0% of the total.·) Thus, it is seen that while 
some of the Seto industrialists came to operate on a bigger scale, most of 
them, with no accumulated capital, continued to complain of their lack of 
funds and, naturally, of difficulty of business operation. Their difficulty 
was heightened by the refusal on the part of the banks, to finance funds 
on credit because articles of pottery were not good security. The whole-
7) Bulletin of the Association of Nippon Pottery Industry, March, 1896. 
8) Bisan Hokan. Vol. III, pp. 159-161. 
9) Bulletin of the ASS0ciation of Nippon Pottery Industry, Vol. 15, 
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sale capitalists in Nagoya would intervene by advancing funds which us-
ually amounted to one-third or one-fourth of the total estimated value of 
the products, the accounts being settled upon the completion and delivery 
of the contracted articles. This formula unavoidably allowed the whole-
salers to make decisions about the price level of the products more or less 
arbitrarily. These wholesalers were in a position to exert constant pres-
sure on the small-scale manufacturers, who, under this pressure, financial 
and otherwise, were left with no margin at their disposal for effecting any 
substantial improvement in the quality of their products, except that they 
were allowed to retain a bare sustenance out of what meagre profit was 
allowed them. Too eager to secure an operating fund, these small pro-
ducers were in no position to adjust their production to the expectable 
demand, with the result they had to content themselves with the uncalcu-
lated production of goods of inferior quality. They were forced to remain 
in the position of debtors; they had no room to think of the promotion 
of their enterprises. According to Table VI, while the number of manufact-
urers showed an increase between 1903 and 1907, except for the duration 
of the RussoJapanese War, the scale of operation on an average substan-
tially remained the same, which was mainly attributable to the high degree 
of exploitation at the hands of the creditor-wholesalers, and the overall 
productivity at Seto was virtually at a standstill. 
About 1882, approximately 20% of the small pottery industrialists at 
Seto had their operating funds advanced by the wholesalers in Nagoya. 
But, after 1900, the situation deteriorated to such an extent that, out of 
396 local industrialists, no less than 346 were generally considered to be 
dominated by wholesale capital under this system of advance.lO) 
Table VI. Enterprises Operated in Seto Between 1903 and 1907.* 














I I I I I 
workers 2856 3784 3605 4509 4381 
employed 
Number of 
I I I I I 
workers per 5. 7 9.1 7.6 8.2 7.5 
manufacturer 
Thus, at the time Seto turned to the production of daily utensils, the 
. c, ·,,'cc·--'-'--'-___ _ 
J 0) Statistical Survey in 1904 of the Pottery in Aichi Prefecture. 
* Tale VI. is from" History of Higashi-Kasugai County," pp. 407-8. 
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wholesaler· capitalists in Nagoya were instrumental in opening the way for 
the Seto products to foreign markets, but they subsequently worked as a 
factor to deprive the Seto industry of the possibility to accumulate indust-
rial capital, and were an obstacle to the development of its productivity,· 
by squeezing out a very high rate of commercial profit. 
In spite of all this, however, Seto could not evade the wave of a 
modern "industrial revolution." . In 1902, the experiment of a coal furnace 
conducted at the Seto Pottery School was greeted with success. This ush-
ered in a wave of coal furnaces ins taIled at local pottery plants. This was 
the first step of the transition toward the coal furnace from the inclined 
kiln which had required pine logs as fuel. To keep up with the trend, 
Mitsui and· Mitsubishi moved to set up their respective coal sales agencies 
in Seto. This incidentally demonstrated that the supplies of fuel resour-
ces, which had up to then constituted one of the principal geographical 
advantages of Seto, had already moved into the gigantic Mitsui and Mi-
tsubishi financial networks, from the hands of neighbouring landowners 
who owned timber land in the mountains. 
As for the earth to be used in pottery, the traditional practice was 
for each small producer separately to buy the powdered stones made 
at water mills in the Sanage area, and the earth from Seto and Akatsu. 
Mingled together, they were processed in a corner of each workshop. 
Following the formation of the Seto Union of Pottery Industrialists and 
Merchants in 1899, all this procedure was placed under the direct supervision 
of the Union. The manufacturing method, however, remained unchanged. 
In view of this, and, for the purposes of mechanizing this particular 
section of the Seto pottery industry, increasing its own commercial profit, 
and, also, with a view to securing the material for a big mechanized 
factory which was contemplated in the near future, the Morimura-gumi, 
in 1903, took the initiative in installing a Western-style water-filtering 
station. With a steam boiler installed, production of more than 375 k.g. of 
processed clay was thus made possible.") Because of the mechanized process 
of the water-filtering station, the clay available was found to be of uniform 
quality, perfectly suitable for making large quantities of articles of identical 
designs. Naturally, the local producers welcomed this novel device without 
exception. The first step, thus, was taken for converting the motive power 
from water to steam, keeping pace with the rapid rise in the demand. 
With regard to the forming process, electricity as motive power was 
first introduced from about 1907, which amounted to a virtual revolutionary 
11) same as 10). 
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step. The consequent simplification of the handling of the potter's wheel, 
which had until that time been operated manually, rendered years' of ap-
prenticeship practically unnecessary, and the workers employed in this pro-
cess, now equipped with modem techniques, could assert themselves to be 
"modern" workers. Production, consequently; registered a marked increase. 
Electricity was subsequently introduced in the process of material earth 
manufacturing. The linking of electrical power, on the other hand, with 
small-scale manufacturing establishments, where sweated labor still prevailed, 
served as an obstacle to the tendency toward a concentration of operation. 
With steadily mounting production in evidence, Seto, situated ina 
small mountaineous basin about 18k.m. to the northeast of Nagoya, felt 
keenly the lack of adequate means of transportation. A survey made in 
1902 showed, in substance, that due to the lack of maritime traffic as well 
as means of railway transportation, the entire 20,000 tons of local pro-
ducts had to be transported to Nagoya by horsedrawn carts, for which an 
estimated sum of ¥32,000 had to be paid per year.") To save the situa-
tion, the Seto Auto-Railway inaugurated the operation of gasoline cars to 
Yada, on the outskirts of Nagoya, in April, 1905. The line was transformed 
into an electric railway in December, 1906, known as the Seto Electric 
Railway. In March 1911, the entire line between Seto and Horikawa, in 
Nagoya, was opened to public service. The revolutionary development of 
transportation facilities, thus brought about, enabled Seto to stand on its 
own modern feet ih regard to the transportation of its products and of 
new material earth and coal. 
True, the successive ihtroduction of coal furnaces, steam-powered earth-
producihg facilities, the operation of potter's wheels with electrical· power 
and the .inauguration of an electric railway transportation service should 
properly be labelled as markihg an apt start for an "industrial revolu-
tion." However the importation of modern mechanized and electrical faci-
lities was carried out by' small-scale pottery industrialists who depended 
upon the sweated labor of the local destitute workers. These industrialists 
were exploited financially by the advancing wholesaler interests, and under 
their domihating influence, the industrialists contihued to be deprived of 
chances of accumulating their own industrial capital. This fact should not 
be overlooked. Under such limitations, the mechanization of the Setoin-
dustry could never be comprehensive. . The appearance of operation of 
large-scale factories, thus, was simply out of the ·question; it just amounted 
to the partial introduction of mechanical devices in the various manufact-
12) same as 10). 
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uring processes of small-scale production. The "industrial revolution,~' 
thus, was highly incomplete and immature." 
The contemporary American market demanded porcelain tablewares 
with fringe patterns painted on a pure-white base, instead of agrc;:yish 
base as heretofore. Such work requiring a high degree of facility,:a.nd 
teclmique could not be done at Seto. Conscious of this, the Morimllra~ 
gumi again took the initiative, and established the Nihon Toki Gomei " 
Kaisha (the Nippon Pottery Unlimited Partnership, changed into Nippon 
Pottery Co. Ltd. in July, 1917) in January, 1904, capitalized at ¥100,000, 
with the intention of setting up a major modern factory. In imitation 
of the German industry, they imported from Germany a complete set of 
the most modern machines, including grinders, press-filtering machines, 
disturbers and magnetic machines for material refining processes, mechan-
ical potter's wheels and friction presses for forming processes, and two-
or three-stage German-type furnaces (with downward flame) and glazing 
coal furnaces for firing processes. With these machines installed, the new 
factory could properly be called a big modern manufacturing plant. The 
power used here was 365 horsepower, while the workers employed consisted 
of 431 men and 79 women in 1909. The factory was located at Noritake in 
Nishi Ward of Nagoya City because of the geographical convenience for the 
transportation of coal and Amakusa stone, absolutely necessary for manu-
facturing hard-quality porcelain articles. The full-fledged industrial revolu-
tion in pottery, the first of its kind in modern Japan, was thus initiated by 
the Morimura-gumi, a representative wholesaler capitalist in Nagoya. By 
1912, Japan was enabled to export to America pure-white base porcelain 
articles in place of the old greyish ones. Thus, the brittleness and 
lack of uniformity of the pottery which had been produced by Nagoya 
wholesaler's Manufactur were overcome. 
Following on the heels of their predecessor, Ichitaro Tashiro and Ume-
taro Kato, in 1908, jointly established the Chigusa Pottery Factory. They 
were followed by Tomeshiro Terasawa, who, in 1911, founded the Teikoku 
Pottery Factory (later named the Nagoya Pottery Factory), while, in 1916, 
the Shirakawa Pottery Factory began operation. It should be noted that 
all these factories, inaugurated in rapid succession in Nagoya, belonged to 
the same category of whole-saler capitalists, who, like the Morimura-gumi, 
had, in the light of the changing times, transformed themselves into 
modern industrial capitalists. 
5. CONCLUSION. 
The outstanding feature of the industrial revolution in pottery in Japan 
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was that, while the Seto industrialists, who had been destined to play the 
role of its principal promoters, were deprived of their potentialities by the 
oppressive influences of the wholesaler capitalists in Nagoya, their role was 
taken over by the latter, who peremptorily undertook to initiate an "im-
ported industriiil revolution" through the importation of all needed modern 
mechanical equipment simultaneously. And, here, a typical example 
of the structural characteristic of Japan's capitalism in operation can be 
observed. Through a tie-up between the absolutistic political power and 
big privileged commercial capital,* it worked to prevent the attainment of 
a full-fledged bourgeoisie revolution by developing industrial capitalists. 
In the meantime, the Nippon Pottery Company afterwards set up a 
number of collateral companies to form a gigantic combination, which came 
to occupy an undisputed position as the representative leader of the entire 
pottery industry of Japan. The fame of its products, known as "Noritake 
China," pervaded the world. The Seto industry, however, with its com-
plicated structure of partial mechanization, small factory, Manafaktur and 
cottage producer, has up till now retained its status as medium or small-
scale enterprise. The" Setomono ", or the products of Seto, came to de-
note cheap goods, which would find their way mainly into the Asiatic and 
South Seas areas, besides the domestic market. Table VII. shows that in 
the case of principal foreign countries, the number of workers employed by a 
pottery factory averages between 102 and 237, but the number drops to a 
mere 9.5 persons in the case of Japan. This gives eloquent proof of the 
peculiar structural features of the industrial revolution in pottery in Japan. 
Table VII. Operation Scale of Pottery Industry in Various Countries.** 
I Number of I Number of I Workers per factories workers factory 
Japan (1937) I 6566 I 62232 I 9.5 
Germany (1928) I 290 I 99000 I 237.9 
Chechoslovakia I 36 I 3900 I 108.3 (1933) 
France (unknown) I 180 I 30000 I 166.6 
England (1930) I 399 I 66118 I 165.7 
U.S.A. (1933) I 231 I 23632 I 102.3 
* Ichizaemon Morimura was appointed special adviser of Nippon Ginko (The Central 
Bank of Japan) in 1882 by Finance Minister Masayoshi Matsukata, and adopted Matsu-
kata's son as his child. From this can be seen the close connection between government 
and big commercial capital at the time. 
** Table VII. is from Mitsubishi Economic Institute: Study of the Structure of Pottery 
Industry, p. 14. 
